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Abstract 
 
Italian history at the beginning of WWI was well harmonised with other events in the Old Continent, while the domestic picture 
featured a delicate set of links, between Triplicist, neutralist, and nationalist environments, parties and movements, with 
"nationalism" acting as a shaping factor in Italy's public scene. But different elements emerged in Italian nationalism that would 
grow into the interventionist policy of an aspiring “great power”, interpreted by some as a line of continuity between liberal and 
fascist foreign policy. The period of neutrality and the events that led to Italy's intervention were in the spotlight of 
historiographical analysis in the post-war years, with both focus on fascist Italy's non-belligerance at the surge of WWII and 
special attention to documentation and the strategies of protagonists (e.g. Giolitti, Salandra, di San Giuliano, Sonnino, 
D’Annunzio, etc.), as well as to careful reconstruction of events the growing consensus for intervention, the personalisation of 
stances for and against intervention, the many elements at play within and outside the country and the clever combination of 
popular mobilisation and parliamentary strategy by supporters of intervention in the weeks between the Treaty of London and 
war. The goal of the paper is to present the evolution of the Italian position from neutrality to the intervention in the war 
alongside the Entente, with a particular attention to international context, to the protagonist of the neutrality period in Italy 
through the memories and the main historiography on the subject. 
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 Introduction 1.
 
"The neutrality of late July and early August is more important and significant than the famous Days of May" (“La 
neutralità di fine luglio e dei primi d’agosto è più importante e significativa delle famose giornate di maggio”), argues one 
of the most comprehensive volumes on the topic (Vigezzi, 1966: XIII). In fact, the period between Vienna's ultimatum to 
Serbia (July 23rd, 1914) and Italy's declaration of war to the Austro-Hungarian Empire (May 23rd, 1915) was characterised 
by neutrality on the side of Italy, strongly anchored in its position as the “last of the great powers” (Decleva, 1974; Serra, 
1990) in the international context of the time. Italian history was then well harmonised with events in the Old Continent, 
while the domestic picture featured a delicate set of interconnections between Triplicist, neutralist, and nationalist 
environments, parties, and movements, with "nationalism" acting as a shaping factor in Italy's public scene. Obviously, 
such interactions fit into a net of complex international interdependence – where a local crisis could turn into a European 
and worldwide conflict (Rusconi, 1987), or a country's policy could shift from neutrality to intervention (Rusconi, 2009) – 
which shuffled the cards in the alliance system formed during the age “of empires” and imperialisms (Hobsbawm, 1987). 
Domestic debate was not limited to the one between supporters of the Triple Alliance in the ruling class and nationalist 
and interventionist environments, but extended to the in-between position that valued neutrality as the best choice.  
In addition to the history of “facts” and the history of “ideas”, historiography has addressed these topics through the 
lenses of a new historical vision, able to highlight the human and material aspects most invested by the conflict (or the 
expectation of the conflict), but also the dramatic end of the much celebrated belle époque that had announced – perhaps 
too hastily – peace and progress for humanity (Valeri, 1975). Optimistic outlooks also extended to the political field, where 
the socialists of the Second International, including in Italy, in front of new improvements in the conditions of working and 
subaltern classes, would see the conflict as “carnage”, a “civil war”. Against this backdrop, two more international stances 
were competing: the aristocratic and legitimist one, a residue – yet a still reactive one – of the ancien régime, and the 
bourgeois, capitalist one, based on the force of modernity (Isnenghi-Rochat, 2008). Progress, however, also created 
need for radical change, facilitating the rise of the need for “adventure” that translates into mythicisation of war (Isnenghi, 
1970) as well as into the evolution of diplomatic relations, which inevitably reflects the changes in power relationships 
among European actors, including Giolitti's Italy, starting from the Berlin Congress of 1978 (Albertini, 2010). In such a 
complex international political framework, united Italy emerges as a rising power and, following the “smack” of Tunisi 
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(under French dominion since 1881), seeks in 1911 (time of the Agadir crisis over the French Morocco question, between 
Germany and France, backed by England) its “fourth shore” with the Lybian campaign (Biagini, 2015; Micheletta-Ungari, 
2013) and played an increasingly significant role in the Adriatic and Balkan region in the eve of the Balkan wars in 1912-
1913 (Biagini, 2012).  
From a political and military standpoint, during the period of neutrality the Italian government maintained the way of 
thinking of a country not at war: in times of peace, the army Chief of Staff (the real commander of the armed forces) was 
subordinated to the Minister of War (an authoritative general), the Prime  Minister, and the King, the supreme authority. 
Italy's neutrality maintained in charge the government of Antonio Salandra, with Domenico Grandi as Minister of War 
(replaced by General Vittorio Zupelli since October 1914) and Luigi Cadorna as Chief of Staff. However, Salandra's 
obsession for secrecy, combined with the need to keep several options open, led to a lack of basic communication with 
Cadorna, who would prepare for war as a last resort for spring 1915 without a dialogue on agreed objectives. Salandra 
and Cadorna appeared to be moving along “parallel lines” (Isnenghi-Rochat, 2008: 155) that excluded Grandi (engaged 
in keeping communication lines open between the government and the army leaders) in favour of General Vittorio 
Zuppelli, who aligned himself with Salandra as his subordinate. As a consequence, the plan for attacking Austria, 
although consistent with a traditional Resurgence, anti-Austrian approach (Cappellano, 2014), was prepared by Cadorna 
and only shared with the King, while the Treaty of London was drafted and signed without involving neither the army nor 
the marine. The fact that the army was finally ready only as late as July, six weeks after the declaration of war, revealed 
the lack of preparation of the Italian army – the plan drafted the previous year had envisaged complete mobilisation in half 
of the time. In 1915, the army itself, while improved in artillery organisation, was approximately in the same conditons as 
in 1914, while the Austro-Hungarian one, though worn out by almost a year of war, appeared stronger than in the 
beginning of the conflict and able to replace losses (the dead, injured, and sick) and deploy in May 1915 as many soldiers 
as in August 1914 (about a million and a half).  
From a political and ideological standpoint, different elements emerged in Italian nationalism that would grow into 
the interventionist policy of an aspiring “great power”, interpreted by some as a line of continuity between liberal and 
fascist foreign policy (Bosworth, 1985). The socio-economic and political-cultural basis was taking shape which would 
stem the controversial genesis of Italian neutrality, with the following, uneasy evolution of Italian policy not only towards 
intervention, but also towards entering war side by side with the powers of the Entente (Albertini, 1951). Such a radical 
change in foreign policy was certainly made possible by the accord maintained by united Italy with English and French 
circles; the bilateral agreements signed in the years preceding the conflict with Paris, London, but also with Petersburg 
(see the 1909 secret Racconigi Bargain on the Balkans in an anti-Habsburg perspective); the strong ties between the 
respective national masonries; but mostly by characters able to successfully mediate for the overcoming of geopolitical 
conflicts, especially with France – in primis, French ambassador in Rome Camille Barrère (Serra, 1950), protagonist with 
Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Prinetti of the exchange of statements that in  1902 envisaged an agreement on the areas 
of interest and non-interest in the Mediterranean (Lybia for Italy, Morocco for France) and in favour of mutual neutrality in 
case of aggression by other powers (Decleva, 1971).  
The period of neutrality and the events that led to Italy's intervention were in the spotlight of historiographical 
analysis in the post-war years, with both focus on fascist Italy's non-belligerance at the surge of WWII (Volpe, 1992) and 
special attention to documentation (Sonnino, 1974; Sonnino, 1972; Albertini, 1968: Giolitti, 1962) and the strategies of 
protagonists, including Giolitti, Salandra, di San Giuliano, Sonnino, D’Annunzio, etc. (Vigezzi, 1969; Ferraioli, 2007; 
Haywood, 1999; Hughes-Hallett, 2014; Guerri, 2008), as well as to careful reconstruction of events (Répaci, 1985; Renzi, 
1987). The centenary of Italy entering war inspired recent contributions on the diverse landscape of Italian neutralism 
(Cammarano, 2015); the growing consensus for intervention (Isnenghi, 2015); the personalisation of stances for and 
against intervention (Compagna, 2015); the many elements at play within and outside the country (Carioti-Rastelli, 2015); 
and the clever combination of popular mobilisation and parliamentary strategy by supporters of intervention in the weeks 
between the Treaty of London and war (Varsori, 2015).  
 
 The Choice of Neutrality 2.
 
In the days between the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and Vienna's ultimatum to Serbia, it was 
apparent even to Germans (in the words of Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow) that "so far, Italian public opinion has 
been as Serbophile as it is generally Austro-phobic" (“l’opinione pubblica italiana si è mostrata fin qui tanto serbofila 
quanto in generale è austrofoba”, Albertini, 1951: 43). Neutrality on the side of the Italian government may well have been 
interpreted as preparation for war, albeit with a peace-time mentality. Support of the Triple Alliance had been the pillar of 
Italian foreign and military policy since its creation in 1882. Furthermore, with the first renewal in 1887, Austria-Hungary 
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had acknowledged Italy's right to fair compensation in case of new gains in the Balkans by the Habsburgs (Salvatorelli, 
1939). Most of diplomatic circles (in primis Riccardo Bollati and Giuseppe Avarna, Italian ambassadors respectively in 
Berlin and in Vienna) were staunch supporters of the Triple Alliance (Varsori, 2015: 67), and so was the army leadership, 
for example General Alberto Pollio, Chief of Staff, who died on July 1st, 1914. His successor, General Luigi Cadorna, was 
appointed on July 27th and, before being informed about the different options, was preparing to enact the military 
convention in an anti-French function (Pieri, 1968: 29-31).  
From a formal point of view, since Austria's ultimatum to Serbia was issued without informing Italy as an ally, the 
obligations of the Alliance were not valid, allowing Foreign Minister Antonino Paternò di San Giuliano to proclaim 
neutrality (August 2nd, 1914) and then raise the issue of the compensation stated in art. VII of the text of the Alliance of 
1891, renewed in 1912. German support to a preemptive action against Belgrade led to Vienna regarding Italy as it did 
Romania, which also signed the Alliance, as a minor power (Bosworth, 1985: 422-423), to the point of informing Rome 
about the ultimatum as late as July 22nd, a few hours before issuing it. Lack of information by Vienna, together with lack of 
compensation for Italy, allowed di San Giuliano (who had already successfully managed Rome's refusal to compensate 
Vienna in the case of the Italian occupation of Dodecanese, during the Italian-Turkish conflict) not only to declare 
neutrality, but also – possibly – to leave the Alliance in favour of the Entente (Valiani, 1977: 89-91). Vanished the 
possibility of a conference of the ambassadors of the great powers to solve the crisis, launched by the Italian Foreign 
Minister, the conflict would immediately turn from regional – with general mobilisations (July 30th in Russia, 31st in Austria-
Hungary, August 1st in France) and declarations of war (Germany's against Russia on August 1st and against France on 
the 3rd, Great Britain's against Germany on the 4th) – into European and then worldwide, with the involvement of colonies 
and extra-European countries, like Japan and US.  
In the spring, Antonio Salandra had succeeded to Giovanni Giolitti as Prime Minister to contain revolutionary leftist 
forces, but Giolitti's Italy had achieved important results in terms of progress and modernisation (increase of national 
income from 60 million liras in 1897 to over 90, with the industry sector growing from almost 20% to 25%), with industry 
and finance seeking out new markets in the Balkans and the Mediterranean (Webster, 1974). The population had 
increased (by almost 4 millions in 15 years, for a total of 36) and become more urbanised and alphabetised, although the 
South lagged behind and emigration flows had reached 900 thousand units in 1913 (Pelaggi, 2015). In this context, 
Giovanni Giolitti, directly or indirectly, also thanks to transformist practices, had carried out modernisation and reform 
policies (Ansaldo, 1963) – for instance, the State no longer backed employers in labour conflicts – extending the 
government's political and social constituency to radicals (and republicans), socialists, and Catholics. In the early 20th 
century, the Socialist Party of reformist Filippo Turati had become close to the government area (Arfè, 1965), while 
Catholic environments had presented new opportunities for collaboration, also thanks to growing engagement at the local 
level (De Rosa, 1979). Furthermore, with King Vittorio Emanuele III, even the monarchy appeared open to reformist 
strategies. Economic and social crisis, however, had brought back tensions in the country at the very eve of the conflict. 
Salandra (who maintained the Ministry of Interiors) had repressed agitations by the socialists who had mobilised in the 
"red week" of June 1914, and socialists had been beaten in the next administrative elections.  
In the first 15 years of the 20th century, nationalism had been emerging in Italy (Gaeta, 1981) with figures of 
different backgrounds and profiles (including Gabriele D’Annunzio and Enrico Corradini) and growing public activity of 
magazines and journals, like Il Regno, Leonardo, Marzocco (Gaeta, 1965), but also La Voce and Lacerba. Their activities 
between summer and fall 1914 are among the clearest examples of evolving environments crossing the line between the 
so-called “liberal party” and interventionist, irredentist nationalism (Vigezzi, 1966: XXXI). Even before the European war, 
since 1910 and the Turkish-Italian war in 1911, nationalism in Italy shifted from the “cultural” to the “political” dimension 
(Varsori, 2015: 30). In 1910, the Italian Nationalist Association was created; the following year, The National Idea was 
published, with contributors including Corradini, Roberto Forges Davanzati, and Francesco Coppola. First an élite, anti-
socialism, and anti-Giolitti movement, nationalists were able to mobilise the small and middle bourgeoisie, students, and 
intellectuals, while the futurists of Filippo Tommaso Marinetti created a new vision of art and life with inequivocably 
bellicist suggestions (Gentile, 2009).  
At the eve of the conflict, the Italian Socialist Party itself was torn by bitter internal debate and expulsions: by siding 
with Giolitti, it gained parliamentary approval for the universal suffrage for men, but in the 13th Congress of July 1912 
reformists were put under accusation, and Leonida Bissolati and Ivanoe Bonomi were expelled. The left wing of the party, 
with Benito Mussolini emerging as a new revolutionary leader against the Lybian war, took the lead, while Mussolini took 
charge of party newspaper l’Avanti!. In the 1913 elections, social-reformists gained back a fair number of MPs. The party 
also supported the government on the intervention at the side of the Entente: Leonida Bissolati became a minister in the 
war governments (June 1916-December 1918) (Colapietra, 1958). The neutralist manifesto of September 21st, 1914 
paved the way for the rift with interventionist revolutionists. On October 18th, with the famous article "From absolute 
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neutrality to active, operating neutrality" (“Dalla neutralità assoluta alla neutralità attiva ed operante”) published on the 
Avanti!, Benito Mussolini announced his break with socialist neutralism and in November 1914, with the support of Filippo 
Naldi (former editor of Resto del Carlino) among others, he founded the Popolo d’Italia with explicitly interventionist 
stances (De Felice, 1965). Although the party's unity was preserved – despite the political distance between reformists 
and revolutionaries – secretary Costantino Lazzari's claim "neither adhesion nor sabotage" could not avoid the rift with 
democratic interventionists either (Valiani, 1977).  
Catholics were experiencing severe internal conflict about the war too. The churches of Europe, as national bodies, 
were involved in war mobilisations. The Catholic Church, given its universalist aspirations, suffered the international 
clash, but Catholics in each country were generally loyal to intervention. In the traditional perspective of alliance between 
"the throne and the altar", the Catholic Church maintained a strong accord with Austria-Hungary and criticised or opposed 
the French republican and Italian liberal governments, although with the Gentiloni pact Catholic candidates had run 
among Giolitti's liberals in the political elections of 1913 (Spadolini, 1974). As regards the European war, however, 
Giacomo Della Chiesa, elected in September 1914 as Pope Benedetto XV following the death of Pio X, saw the conflict 
as “God's punishment” over Europe, that had shunned the Church's authority and Christian spirituality: the encyclical Ad 
Beatissimi Apostolorum of November 1914 was a fervent call to warring nations to halt the conflict.  
In August, the strong impression made by the German advance through Belgium and France, towards Paris, 
seemed to support the Triplicist thesis. Yet, in mid-September, with the “miracle of Marna” and the stabilisation of the 
Western front, the stance in favour of the Entente gained ground, also strenghtened by the difficulties met by Austria-
Hungary in the Serbian campaign (as early as mid-August, with the Serbian victory in the battle of Cer, from the name of 
the river, also known as battle of Jadar) and on the Eastern front (although the Tsar's troops, after a first advance in 
Eastern Prussia, were defeated in Tannenberg and on the Masuri lakes) with the Russian advance in Galicia, in 
Habsburg territory. Over the month, contacts with Romania led to signing a pact, on September 23rd, through which 
Rome and Bucharest committed to coordinate for neutrality for common goals, claiming those regions under Habsburg 
dominion inhabited by Italians and Romanians respectively, thus creating the basis for possible entering war 
simultaneously at the side of the Entente (Biagini, 2007). As early as the first week of August, Russian Foreign Minister 
Sergey Sazonov had illustrated Italian ambassador Andrea Carlotti the possible gains for Italy – and against Austria – in 
case of opting for the Entente: di San Giuliano, a staunch Triplicist, suddenly seemed to have become an “Austro-phobe” 
(Torre, 1963). In fact, he was carefully considering the possible war scenarios, identifying terms of negotiation between 
intervention with the Entente and neutrality, as Berlin's main objective (Monticone, 1971). On August 9th, di San Giuliano 
first formulated Italy's requests in a letter to Salandra, while a round of contacts with Russian, British, and French 
representatives increased the Entente's interest and the promised compensation for Italian intervention against Vienna. In 
these very days, in Fiuggi, where di San Giuliano was recovering from gout, the meetings with German ambassador in 
Italy Hans von Flotow convinced him that, although Germany could mediate for Austrian compensation to Italy, Vienna 
was not willing to apply art. VII nor to give up any Habsburg territory (like Trentino). On September 16th, having identified 
London as the most appropriate location for secret contacts with the Entente, di San Giuliano tasked Italian ambassador 
in the United Kingdom Guglielmo Imperiali with resuming contacts with British Foreign Minister Edward Grey. On 
September 25th, in the famous long telegram to the Cabinet, di San Giuliano finally formulated Italy's requests for the 
Entente in 16 points, including: naval operations in support to Italy in the Adriatic; militar and naval agreement; in case of 
victory, the establishment of natural borders – up to the Quarnaro – purposefully leaving out the delicate question of 
Dalmatia; partition of Albania with Valona under Italian control; preservation of Dodecanese as Italian; Italian control of 
the Ottoman region of Adalia; war compensation; possible – though unlikely – consideration of compensation in Tunisia 
for entering war; a loan of at least 40 million pounds on the London stock market. For di San Giuliano and Salandra, the 
historical moment was favourable for achieving “natural borders” and satisfying “legitimate” national aspirations – Italy's 
“sacred egoism”, as effectively put by Salandra when taking the interim post after the Foreign Minister's death – and 
needed to be promptly exploited by siding with the Entente, although the complexity of the negotiation and, especially, 
Italy's notorious lack of military preparation called for slower developments. Despite his premature death on October 16th, 
1914, di San Giuliano's general terms remained valid during Salandra's interim and Sidney Sonnino's term, until the 
intervention of the following year (Giordano, 2012: 286-298).  
In such a complex framework, the dialectics between interventionist and neutralist parties and movements 
overlapped with those between popular movements (extreme radical and democratic) and “order” formation (liberal, 
Catholic, nationalist) without a real match in parties, leaving extensive grey areas on war commitments in the other main 
split, the one between those “for and against Giolitti” (Vigezzi, 1966: XL). It is therefore appropriate to see, on one side, 
the neutralism of Catholics and supporters of Giolitti as an expression of sincere fear of democratic interventionism and 
social revolution; on the other, the interventionism of democratics and nationalists, but also of part of the bourgeoisie, as 
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a radical, positive change that Italy needed. The restless personalities in Giolitti's current included more than a few 
conservative representatives of the liberal party, who resented Giolitti's openings towards socialists and Catholics, that 
suggested a return to the original spirit of the Risorgimento and the Statuto Albertino, i.e. to the centrality of the monarch. 
That was the case of Sidney Sonnino, author of the article "Let's go back to the Statute" (“Torniamo allo Statuto”), 
published in 1897 in journal La Nuova Antologia, former Minister of the Treasury and Finances, Prime Minister (in 1906 
and 1909-10), before becoming Foreign Minister in the Salandra II government since November 1914 (Ballini, 2011). The 
alliance was back with the other influential conservative, Antonio Salandra, with whom Sonnino, in 1901, had founded in 
Rome Il Giornale d’Italia, soon to become the main voice of monarchic-conservative liberals against Giolitti. The “national 
policy” inaugurated by Antonio Salandra, that embodied the need to move away from Giolitti's heritage of the previous 15 
years (Carocci, 1971), was the product of such a context.  
Sonnino's appointment appeared to be consistent with the previous policy: starting from Triplicist positions, on 
September 24th, Sonnino stated his support for intervention with the Entente. On November 5th, once appointed, he 
prepared to received the long telegram from the government. At the end of the month, ambassador Imperiali, back to Italy 
for a few days, personally received from Sonnino directions to continue the meetings in London. In the meanwhile, the 
conflict had spread to the colonial areas in Africa and Asia, while factions had widened: at the end of August, Japan had 
joined Serbia (and Montenegro) and the Entente and soon fought some German colonies in the Pacific area; the Ottoman 
empire had sided with Austria-Hungary and Germany between late October and early November. In November, the 
Austro-Hungarian advance in Serbian territory and the occupation of Belgrade – won back by the Serbs in the first half of 
December – made the situation more interesting for Italy and Sonnino, who had raised the issue of compensation for the 
modification of the status quo in the Balkans, calling for Germany's mediation. Contacts in Rome were made with Austro-
Hungarian representative in Italy Karl von Macchio (who had replaced ambassador Kajetan Mérey, prevented from 
fulfilling his diplomatic function by health issues since the Sarajevo assassination) and especially with Bernhard von 
Bülow, former German ambassador to Italy, then Foreign Minister and Prime Minister – an authoritative figure in 
diplomatic mission in Rome. In the meantime Italy, that in the second half of October had already deployed a “sanitary” 
mission to Valona, had the green light to consolidate a bridgehead in Albanian territory (Montanari, 1978). At the end of 
December, Italy had occupied the isle of Saseno (strategically important for access to the northern Adriatic) with the 
marine, and the port of Vlorë with the 10th regiment of Bersaglieri and a mountain battalion.  
Sonnino's meetings with von Bülow and then Macchio took place in the first half of December: Berlin confirmed its 
willingness to maintain good relationships with Italy and mediate to soften Vienna's rigid position (a similar expedition to 
Vienna followed by prince Karl von Wedel), only characterised at the time by a vague, generic willingness to possibly 
ceding Trentino and, only following delicate negotiations, greater autonomy for the Italians of Trieste. These points 
remained mostly unchanged until February, with Vienna making a point of both asking for a "definition" of Trentino and 
requiring Rome to give up Trieste, while Italy refrained from specifying any request in order not to limit its options and 
claims. Even Germany's attempt to get the Vatican's mediation for a compromise solution on Trentino (Austria ceding the 
region to the Vatican, which in turn would give it over to Italy) met both Italy's rejection and the Vatican's skepticism. All 
over Italy, in the meanwhile, interventionist groups and irredentist associations gained ground, especially thanks to the 
mobilising skills of figures like Cesare Battisti (Pieri, 1965), former deputy for Trentino in Austria-Hungary and convinced 
supporter of intervention during Italy's period of neutrality. In the cities, from irredentist and student groups to artistic and 
intellectual environments, the interventionist minority got better and better organised to push the government towards 
war. Despite counter-mobilisation by socialists, able to gather large masses in the streets, clashes with interventionists 
generally turned in favour of the latter (Valiani, 1977: 102).  
At the beginning of the year, Italy was hit by another massive earthquake after the one in 1908. On January 13th, a 
strong quake hit the area of Marsica, Abruzzo – extending as far as Lazio (the epicentre was in the basin of Fucino, town 
of Avezzano), killing over 30 thousands. Diplomatic activities – secret and public – were resumed on different fronts in the 
new year. Dialogue with Romania and Ion Brâtianu started back in January, leading to the secret agreement of February 
6th, with Rome and Bucharest committing for four months to defend each other if attacked by Vienna. The four-month 
deadline, set at the eve of the possible intervention, allowed Italy the time and secrecy to negotiate for war. On the 
nationalist and interventionist fronts, the futurists bashed Italy's "provincial", "petty" nature, its dusty, sterile attachment to 
the past, calling for war as the "sole hygiene of the world", “medicine” for the evils of the time. Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, 
Umberto Boccioni, Carlo Carrà, and the futurists organised meetings in theatres and squares to push Italians to war and 
see a new, modern, "Italianist" nation rise from the blood (Gentile, 2009). Journals like Lacerba filled up with bellicist 
jubilation with famous Ardengo Soffici and Giovanni Papini. From the heart of warring France, D’Annunzio followed 
military operations behind the Western front line and relentlessly argued for mobilisation in support of the “Latin 
brotherhood” on French magazines (like Le Figaro) and on Il Corriere della Sera of his friend and fellow Luigi Albertini. 
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His bloody odes and descriptions of French sacrifice waiting for the Italian intervention had great resonance in Italy as 
well. Italians in Paris, massively present in the world's cultural capital of the time as factory workers, intellectuals, and 
artists, were mobilising too (Dotoli, 1984). In the early days of national mobilisation, Ricciotto Canudo (musicologist and 
theorist of film as the ultimate modern "art") and other notable foreign intellectuals called for voluntary enrollment in the 
French Foreign Legion. Many Italians answered that call since the early weeks of the conflict (Milza, 1986), and wearing 
the red shirt under the French uniform they formed the legion of Peppino Garibaldi, son of Ricciotti, that would be 
decimated in the Forest of Argonne (Répaci, 1985).  
The neutralist front relied on the only figure able to gather political and civic consensus: Giovanni Giolitti, a 
neutralist since the early days of conflict, who was convinced that Italy was unprepared for war and concerned about the 
social risks of intervention. After a series of meetings with journalists, politicians, and diplomats (like the famous one with 
von Bülow), in the beginning of the year he was prompted by his entourage to take a stand to prevent an interventionist 
turn. In a letter dated January 20th, he defended his neutralist stance, defined war as a “disgrace”, and argued that Italy 
could obtain "a lot" (“molto”) without war. Published on La Tribuna on February 1st, the letter read "quite a lot" 
(“parecchio”) instead of “a lot”, with the former phrase becoming the formula of the opportunist neutralism of Giolitti 
supporters. The press wars had already started in the fall, with significant German investment in Triplicist propaganda 
and French interventionist activity in support of the Entente, including with strong contacts between Italian and French 
masons (Mola, 1976).  
In February, Berlin tasked German Catholic MP Matthias Erzberger with mediating between the Vatican and the 
Italian government. However, Sonnino and the liberal government of resurgentist tradition would firmly oppose any 
involvement of the Vatican. Although the dialogue remained officially open for Austrian compensation to Italy, secret 
negotiations were resumed in London since March 1st, given the virtual stagnation of dialogue with Austria despite the 
German mediation (Monticone, 1971). On the war front, the Allies led Italy and other neutral countries to believe in an 
upcoming turn with the operations against the Ottoman Empire, aimed at landing in Gallipoli to reach Constantinople. 
Since early March, with the king's placet, ambassador Imperiali resumed negotiations with Grey on the basis of the “long 
telegram”. Doubts started to emerge on the demands related to the Adriatic area, in Albania and Dalmatia, especially in 
pro-Serbian circles, in primis the Russian government, as well as Anatolia. In the same days, Vienna (where in early 
January Foreign Minister Leopold Berchtold had been replaced by István Burián because of his position, too open to the 
possibility of ceding Trentino) decided to resume negotiations directly with Rome (Valiani, 1966: 108), as von Bülow 
communicated to Sonnino on March 8th. Pressured by interventionist public opinion, excited by the Allies landing to 
Gallipoli, the Italian government immediately raised the condition of immediate territorial cession (on the basis of 
nationalists gaining ground) rather than at the end of the conflict, as suggested by Austria. Germany's mediation seemed 
to leave some options open, but direct meetings between ambassador Avarna and Burián, taking place in Vienna in late 
March, showed that Austria was only willing to negotiate on part of Trentino. In early April, however, Vienna 
circumscribed Trentino to the territories of Trento, Rovereto, Riva, and Tione. Sonnino eventually defined Austria's 
proposal as unsatisfactory. With negotiations with the Entente reaching an advanced stage, he presented Vienna with 
counter-demands analogous to those made to London (Varsori, 2015: 90-93). In mid-April, with some concessions by 
Italy, an agreement was reached on the peninsula of Sabbioncello, paving the way for the draft of the Treaty of London. 
At the same time, Vienna envisaged possible further concessions in Trentino, though leaving out the other territories 
claimed by Rome. The secrecy with which Rome was preparing to sign the Treaty of London pushed Salandra and 
Sonnino to drag out negotiations with Austria, which found an influential back-up in Giovanni Giolitti, who maintained the 
majority in Parliament, again at the centre of contacts with von Bülow. 
 
 The Treaty of London and the Intervention 3.
 
A balance was reached, with the end of the so-called “war of Sabbioncello” and Italian demands leaving out Fiume and 
Ragusa (Dubrovnik), that after the war, according to Sonnino and Imperiali, would grant access to the sea from the 
Croatian and Serbian inland respectively. This allowed to reach an agreement on a virtually definitive draft, to be signed 
on April 26th, regarded by Rome as “moderate” and able to avoid Slavic hegemony in the Adriatic even in case of Vienna 
collapsing – an option that Italian diplomacy did not rule out (Varsori, 2015: 89-90, 113-114). The Treaty of London was 
then the negotiation basis for intervention with the Entente, aimed at guaranteeing Italy the achievement of the “natural 
borders” and the "necessary security" in the Adriatica area (Toscano, 1934). It included: military agreements (art. 1) 
between the Entente (England, France, Russia) and Italy; a naval agreement between Italy, England, and France (art. 3) 
against Austria-Hungary; cession of Trentino and Tirolo up to Brennero, Trieste, Gorizia, Gradisca, and Istria up to the 
Quarnaro (art. 4); the province of Dalmatia (art. 5) with part of the opposite islands; the neutrality of the peninsula of 
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Sabbioncello and the opposite coast, of the coast from Cattaro to Durrës (except for the territories of Montenegro), and 
the islands not assigned to Italy; the assignation of the territories of the region to Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro, and of 
Durrës to the "Muslim" Independent State of Albania; in Albania (art. 6) Italy received the sovereignity on Vlorë and the 
island of Saseno; in case of actual assegnation of the lands as per art. 4 and art. 5, Italy would not oppose the partition of 
northern and southern Albanian regions in favour of Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece. The agreement confirmed: full 
sovereignity on the Dodecanese; the possible Italian dominion over the Turkish region of Adalia; Italy's dominion over 
Lybia; compensation in proportion to the military effort; and possible "fair" compensation for increasing the Entente's 
possessions in the African colonies (art. 13). England committed to immediately issue a 50-million-pounds loan on the 
London stock market (art. 14), while the Entente committed to support Italy's opposition to the Vatican's participation in 
peace negotiations (art. 15).  
In these very days, through direct contacts, Vienna – aided by Berlin – addressed Rome with new concession 
proposals (including the status of free cities, though under nominal Austrian sovereignity, for Trieste and Fiume), 
announcing the arrival in Rome of a new mediator in the person of Count Agenor von Go?uchowski. On the other hand, 
an exchange of wishes between the Italian and English monarchs and the tsar eventually formalised the involvement of 
Vittorio Emanuele in Italy's new international positioning. Some rumours on the agreement with the Entente started to 
surface from the Allies' circles in Paris, and Italy's demands in the Adriatic alarmed not only the well-known pro-Yugoslav 
circles of the Times, but also the Serbian and Russian governments. At the domestic level, pacifist demonstrations had 
intensified in view of May 1st, while in Lybia the Italian army had suffered a heavy defeat in Gasr bu Hàdi on April 28th (Del 
Boca, 2004). On May 1st, however, the Council of Ministers finally decided to repeal the Triple Alliance in order to pursue 
an agreement with the Entente, as the treaty had yet to be officially signed. Salandra and Sonnino were mostly 
concerned with formulating a text (sent to the ambassadors in Vienna and Berlin on May 3rd) that would be as aggressive 
as possible towards Austria and as little aggressive as possible towards Germany. On May 5th, von Bülow met Sonnino at 
Palazzo della Consulta, anticipating Austria's proposal of cession of the entire Trentino, green light on Albania, and 
autonomy for Trieste with Italian university.  
In Italy, in the meantime, various environments mobilised for war. The widening of the interventionist front with the 
Entente was signalled by the activity of several press organs, in primis Il Corriere della Sera of Luigi Albertini, and the 
feverish expectation for the glorification of Garibaldi's veterans and Gabriele D’Annunzio, who prepared for a triumphal 
return. An excellent opportunity came with Garibaldi's veterans invitation to D'Annunzio to join them in Genoa for an 
interventionist mobilisation with 2 thousands red shirts. Ettore Cozzani, editor of magazine L’Eroica, organised the 
inauguration of a monument to Garibaldi's Thousand, to be held in Quarto on May 5th. Sending the preliminary text to 
Prime Minister Salandra produced a first round of censorship and led the King to announce he would not attend, contrary 
to what d’Annunzio had wished. The occasion was favourable for  a walkabout: the arrival in Italy on a night train, with the 
red shirts led by Peppino Garibaldi, was accompanied by crowds cheering for Italy and France. The same happened at 
the train station in Genoa, where the occasion had gathered noted interventionist figures, including Cesare Battisti 
(Guerri, 2008: 194). The speech of Quarto, published on May 5th on Corriere della Sera, was riveting, classic D'Annunzio 
repertoire, evocative of the ancient glories of Roman history and the recent Italian Resurgence. D’Annunzio's speech 
marked the beginning of the “radiant days of May”, with Italian interventionist public opinion bursting into the national 
political scene and paving the way for an institutional coup (Varsori, 2015).  
On the other hand, neutralists gathered around Giolitti. In those days, many  sent him alarmed letters about the 
government's “disinterest” for Austria's proposals and the rumours coming from the Entente's circles about an agreement 
for intervention against Austria-Hungary. The events of early May (the repeal of the Triple Alliance, the speech of Quarto) 
convinced him to reach the capital in view of the summoning of the Parliament. On May 6th, Austria reiterated the 
proposals for Italy to stay neutral, both to Rome – directly and indirectly through Vatican contacts – and through German 
mediation in Berlin. The following day, however, Sonnino announced the Council of Ministers that the Triple Alliance had 
been repealed and an agreement had been reached with the Entente and communicated to Vienna and Berlin (so that 
Austria's proposals would appear as non acceptable). On Sunday, May 9th, Giolitti reached Rome, while Salandra was 
being received by Vittorio Emanuele, who encouraged the Prime Minister to meet with Giolitti and stated his willingness to 
abdicate in case the stability of the monarchy was endangered. After Treasury Minister Paolo Carcano met Giolitti and 
received his gloomy forecasts in case of war, Salandra returned to the King and declared his willingness to resign. The 
day after, on Monday morning, the King finally met Giolitti, who indicated backing down from the commitment to the 
Entente and accepting Vienna's proposals as the best path. When the King shared this with Salandra, he was expectably 
unwilling to go that way. On the same day, Giolitti finally met Salandra, confirming his position, but reassuring him about 
his unavailability to lead a new government supporting the Triple Alliance. Giolitti emerged from these meetings as the 
ultimate arbiter of the situation and received the cards of over 300 MPs in sign of support. On May 11th, Sonnino received 
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a letter from von Bülow with Austria's last and most favourable proposal to Italy, with Germany's guarantee. Salandra met 
again with the King for updates on his meeting with Giolitti. On May 12th, the Council of Ministers was notified of Austria's 
latest proposals and the result of the meetings with Giolitti: the government's resignations appeared as the only way out. 
On May 13th, Salandra, in front of a slight parliamentary majority, decided to announce the resignations the day after. The 
news, already distributed by the Stefani agency in the evening, not only disoriented the Entente's diplomatic circles 
(present in Rome with French  ambassador Barrère, English James Rennel Rodd, and the new Russian ambassador 
Mikhail Nikolajevic Giers), but gave interventionists the confirmation of the necessity of a mobilisation already ongoing, in 
front of the possibility of a crisis directed by Giolitti, or rather the success of the so-called “Bülow-Giolitti intrigue” (Varsori, 
2015: 159). On May 12th, D’Annunzio's arrival in Rome marked the nationalists' escalation of violence against the 
neutralists, with about 100 thousand people welcoming and accompanying him to the Hotel Regina. The speech of the 
following day, Al popolo di Roma in tumulto ("To the people of Rome in turmoil"), was a call for violence, answered by 
students that tried to assault Montecitorio and Giolitti's residence. While interventionist and nationalist organs like Idea 
nazionale menacingly appealed to the King in favour of war and Salandra's re-appointment, on the 15th the King met 
Giolitti to ask for his availability to lead a new government. His refusal of a solution that would exhacerbate tensions, 
together with lack of alternatives, led Vittorio Emanuele to reject Salandra's resignations on the evening of Sunday, May 
16th. Interventionists and nationalists rejoiced in Rome (where students were particularly numerous) and Milan (where 
revolutionary unionists had mobilised, including Mussolini, Corridoni, and Alceste De Ambris). Neutralists, who had 
produced a few important demonstrations in the previous days (promptly repressed by law enforcement), but unable to 
mobilise the masses, were by then marginalised. The “radiant days of May” escalated in a rapid succession of events: 
Salandra, strenghtened by the maneuvre, summoned the Council of Ministers and confirmed the session for May 20th to 
require full powers in view of the declaration of war. On the 18th, while ambassador Macchio, with a glimmer of hope, 
delivered to Sonnino a proposal for an agreement with Austria, Giolitti left Rome, seeing it as pointless to participate in 
the parliamentary session. On the 20th, Sonnino presented with the Libro Verde ("Green Book") a reconstruction of the 
failed agreement with Vienna to justify the support to the Entente. With only 64 votes against, Italy prepared to enter war. 
On May 23rd, the declaration of war was delivered to Austria-Hungary. On May 24th, the war started on the Eastern 
border. 
 
 Conclusions 4.
 
The events that led Italy to abandon neutrality and enter war with the Entente have been elaborated through the historical 
and popular memories (Mondini, 2014) as well as those of the protagonists (Giolitti, 1972; Salandra, 1928 and 1930) and 
with focus on results and consequences on liberal Italy (Seton-Watson, 1976), especially on the “beginning of revolution” 
or “general rehearsal” that the “radiant May” represented for the rise of fascism and the March on Rome (Volpe, 1992; 
Tasca, 1965) as a virtual coup. In the early post-war period, doubts were already raised on the one hand, about the 
actual existence of a neutralist majority in the country and its institutions (Croce, 2004); on the other hand, on the 
diplomatic activity of the Salandra government (Salvemini, 1970). In general, however, historians have confirmed the 
legitimacy of the choice by democratic interventionists and of the institutional mechanism that led to a parliamentary 
majority in support of war (Bonomi, 1966).  
Anyhow, it is apparent how the organised minority that led Italy into war had its main figures in Salandra and 
Sonnino, and could count on an agitator like D’Annunzio to mobilise the masses in support of the act of force (Varsori, 
2015: 183). The “radiant May” definitely closes Giolitti's age and brings into play new political and civic forces, that would 
be at the centre of Italy's political life until the end of the Second World War.  
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